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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is rare for cases concerning animal welfare legislation to reach the 
Constitutional Court. The case of NSPCA v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (‘NSPCA case)2 is therefore notable in that the constitutionality of 
sections of the Performing Animals Protection Act 24 of 1935 (‘PAPA’) was placed 
under scrutiny. Even more importantly, two sections of the Act, which could be 
regarded as its heart and soul were declared unconstitutional. The Constitutional 
Court has effectively placed the government now on terms to require a revision 
of, at least, this piece of legislation.  
In this note, I wish to consider the judgment of the Constitutional Court from a 
perspective that is concerned with the welfare of animals.3 This may  seem 
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surprising as the judgment itself says nothing about animal welfare  and is 
focused mainly on the separation of powers; it is this very omission, however, 
that will be the focus of my analysis. In the first section, I consider the scheme of 
the PAPA as well as the reasoning of the Constitutional Court. The second section 
involves a critical evaluation of the reasoning of the Court. I seek to show how its 
conclusions relating to separation of powers required some engagement with the 
particular subject matter of this legislation – the protection of animals. The 
omission to engage with the issue of animal welfare highlights a significant gap in 
in the reasoning of the court. The gap, implicitly, indicates troubling ideological 
assumptions concerning animals that appear to have been made  by the court. In 
section three, I seek to consider how the court’s judgment could have been 
reconstructed in a manner that would have been more justifiable and embraced a 
more progressive approach towards animals. Whilst the court’s ultimate 
conclusion was justifiable, a different process of reasoning would have been 
preferable. The fourth and final part of this paper brings a case from India which 
also concerned performing animals in circuses as a contrast.  I attempt to 
demonstrate the substantive, compassionate reasoning embodied in that case 
which provides an important counterpoint to the rather disconnected, formalist 
reasoning of our own court. The conclusion indicates that the court’s judgment 
has indeed finally required a revision of animal welfare legislation by the 
government. The discussion in this note is used to provide a guide to how some of 
the core issues facing legislators should be addressed.  
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2. THE PAPA AND THE JUDGMENT 
The case concerned an application by the National Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals (‘NSPCA’) to have sections of the PAPA declared 
unconstitutional. The PAPA seeks to regulate and govern a particular sub-set of 
the human engagement with animals, namely, the ‘exhibition or training of 
performing animals and the use of dogs for safeguarding’.4 To ‘exhibit’ an animal 
is defined as exposing it for show ‘at any entertainment to which the public are 
admitted, whether for payment of money or otherwise’.5 The basic condition 
placed upon anyone seeking to use animals for performance is that they apply for 
and receive a license.6 Importantly, for this case, it is magistrates who are 
empowered in terms of the Act to grant or refuse such licenses.  
Section 2 provides that a person who wishes to exhibit or train for exhibition any 
animal (or use dogs for safeguarding) must apply for a license to the magistrate in 
the district in question. The magistrate must grant the license provided s/he is 
satisfied that the person in question is a fit and proper person. The license lasts 
for one calendar year and a magistrate is empowered to refuse to renew a license 
if there is ‘good and sufficient reason’ (which is not further specified). The Act 
authorizes the Minister to develop a prescribed form for the application and 
allows the Minister to add further conditions for the granting of such a license.  
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The regulations that were passed in terms of the PAPA add a requirement that an 
application for a license be accompanied by a report by the district police 
commissioner regarding the applicant’s fitness to be a licensee7 and the payment 
of a small fee. They also allow a magistrate to request all available information 
concerning the licensee from local animal organizations as well as information 
concerning the type of animal in respect of which the license in applied for in 
order to decide whether to grant the application.8 The regulations also require  
that if wild or vicious animals are trained, the licensee must take the steps 
necessary to keep the animals under control.9 They also prohibit the use of an 
animal for exhibition, training or safeguarding where that animal is suffering from 
a disease or injury.10  
Section 3 of the PAPA provides that a license-holder may only conduct the 
activities regulated in the Act upon being granted a certificate by the magistrate 
in the district. The certificate must specify the form of training, exhibition or use 
of the animals in question that is permitted and various provisions allow for the 
amendment of the certificate. 11 
The main issue under consideration in this case was whether or not the 
assignment to magistrates of the power to decide on applications for licenses and 
certificates concerning animal training and exhibition was consistent with the 
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doctrine of the separation of powers. The High Court found that the ‘functions of 
issuing of licenses and certificates as envisaged in sections 2 and 3 are executive 
or administrative functions which have nothing to do with the core judicial 
functions of magistrates’.12 These provisions therefore violated the separation of 
powers enshrined in the Constitution and were, therefore, unconstitutional. 
Legodi J ordered that they be revised by parliament within six months. He also 
made an interim order in which he created a committee to exercise the licensing 
function temporarily (pending confirmation of his judgment and the defect being 
cured) that would include an expert team comprising animal welfare experts from 
the NSPCA and Veterinary Council as well as members of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.13  
The judgment then went to the Constitutional Court for confirmation. The Court 
used the opportunity to engage in some detail with the separation of powers 
doctrine and to summarize some of the key elements of the doctrine that have 
emerged in the jurisprudence of the court thus far. It went rather extensively 
through the key cases that have been decided up until this point and summarized 
the circumstances under which a magistrate may be permitted to perform an 
administrative function.14 The court concluded that an appropriate approach 
would need to take into account various considerations:  
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‘Although it must be based upon an acceptance of the reality that our model of separation 
of powers is not one that requires a complete or total separation and that it permits the 
performance of some non-judicial functions by the Judiciary, it must be an approach that 
promotes rather than dilutes the principle of the separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary’.15  
The court then went on to develop a series of questions (which can  be 
understood to be  a  test) to determine whether the performance by a member of 
the judiciary offends the separation of powers as follows: 
(a) Whether the function is a non-judicial function. If it is a judicial function, 
then there is no separation of powers problem;  
(b) Whether the performance of the non-judicial function by the judiciary is 
expressly provided for in the Constitution. If so, there can be no separation 
of powers problem; 
(c) Whether the performance of the non-judicial function is closely connected 
to a core function of the judiciary. If it is, then there is no separation of 
powers problem; 
(d) Whether there is any compelling reason why a non-judicial function of this 
kind should be performed by a member of the judiciary and not a member 
of the executive. If there is no good reason, then the separation of powers 
is offended. 16 
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The main enquiry in this particular case was whether or not question (d) could be 
answered adequately as the power in the PAPA did not fall into any of the other 
categories. Zondo J (writing on behalf of a unanimous court) could not find any 
good reason why a magistrate should perform the licensing functions granted to 
them in the PAPA. The central reasoning that led to this conclusion is included in 
the following paragraph which will be further analysed below: 
‘I do not see why, if, for example a non-judicial body or officer can be given the power to 
issue casino or liquor licenses, a judicial officer such as a Magistrate should be assigned the 
function of issuing animal training and exhibition licenses. If we were to hold that it accords 
with this country’s model of separation of powers for a statutory provision to require a 
member of the Judiciary to issue animal training and exhibition licenses and that does not 
offend the separation of powers, where will the requirement for the performance of 
administrative functions by Magistrate’s stop?’
17  
This reasoning leads the court to find that the separation of powers doctrine was 
violated by the PAPA and the provisions in question were declared 
unconstitutional. The court gave parliament 18 months to cure the defect but 
suspended the declaration of validity to allow the existing provisions to continue 
to operate pending the required revisions.  
3. WHAT WAS LEFT UNSAID: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE JUDGMENT 
This case is the first in which animal welfare legislation has been reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court in the new democratic era. Yet, the judgment completely 
ignores this fact or the real subject matter of the dispute. Indeed, underlying the 
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arguments relating to the separation of powers, was clearly a substantive dispute 
between the parties concerning the protections to be afforded to animals. The 
NSPCA is itself a body specifically set up by statute to protect animals and, it can 
thus reasonably be inferred, that its decision to bring this case to court related to 
the fact that the provisions of the Act were offering little protection for 
performing animals. Magistrates anywhere in the country were empowered to 
grant such licenses and very little guidance is provided in the law as to the factors 
that must be taken into account in doing so. Support for this inference can be 
gleaned from the request in the papers that the NSPCA be granted the power to 
decide about license applications in relation to performing animals.18 Presumably, 
this was because of a concern that had arisen in practice concerning the issuing of 
licenses by magistrates in this regard. The Minister of Agriculture’s submission 
also recognized the need for ‘expertise’ in deciding on matters relating to license 
permits regarding performing animals.19  
Interestingly, those opposing the order were the Licensed Animal Trainers 
Association which is the industry association of those who train or exhibit animals 
or use dogs for safeguarding. The order  was also opposed by the Commercial 
Producers Association which is an association of commercial film producers which 
produce marketing or advertising campaigns for television or cinema and the 
South African Association of Stills Producers who produce adverts for use in the 
print media. Clearly, performing animals are used by all these bodies: it is not 
entirely clear why they opposed the order, but, a reasonable inference would be 
                                                          
18
 NSPCA High Court para 28.  
19
 Ibid para 39.  
9 
 
that the current regime worked reasonably well for them in acquiring licenses and 
they were  concerned about a stricter regime replacing it.  
Despite the fact that there clearly was an underlying dispute concerning the 
protection of animals, it could be objected that courts must only address the 
arguments presented to them. The case was argued on the basis of the separation 
of powers and, therefore, there was no need for the constitutional court to 
address any issues relating to animal welfare. I agree with the contention that the 
court was entitled to avoid animal welfare arguments if this were not relevant to 
the main basis of the constitutional challenge. However, as I shall show, the 
judgment of court could not coherently avoid questions of animal welfare in 
reaching its conclusions concerning the separation of powers.   
The Court ultimately ruled that there was no good reason why magistrates (as 
part of the judiciary) should exercise the licensing functions granted to them in 
the PAPA. In order to make out that case, it is necessary to engage in some detail 
with the reasons provided by the court in reaching this conclusion. The first line of 
reasoning provided by the court was to make an argument by analogy. The court’s 
argument can be captured in the following syllogism:  
(a)  Non-judicial bodies are tasked with deciding upon whether to issue casino 
or liquor licenses;  
(b) There is no relevant difference between such licenses and licenses relating 
to animal training and exhibition;  
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(c) Therefore, there is no good reason for the judiciary (and every reason for 
non-judicial bodies) to be tasked with deciding upon the issuing of licenses 
relating to the exhibition and training of performing animals.  
The problem with this argument lies in the second premise: the court provides no 
reason to support this proposition and simply assumes it to be the case. Yet, the 
question arises whether licenses relating to casinos and liquor are really 
analogous to those concerning the exhibition and training of performing animals? 
When the question is raised in this manner, there are some obvious points of 
dissimilarity: licenses under the PAPA relate to an extremely vulnerable group of 
creatures (non-human animals) who are often the subject of terrible abuse when 
required to perform in these industries.20 The license system is a mechanism for 
‘protecting’ performing animals as is indicated by the title of the Act itself. 
Licenses under the PAPA relate to protecting vulnerable sentient creatures from 
harm by very powerful owners. Moreover, the needs and capacities of these 
animals require detailed understanding and knowledge.  
These elements are distinguishable from licenses relating to casinos and liquor. 
These licenses  regulate industries that do often lead to  social problems: 
however, regulation in this area importantly governs practices that are engaged in 
by human beings who have the choice whether to do so or not. Regulation in this 
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area rather involves protecting human beings from harming themselves (having a 
paternalistic justification).  Gambling and alcohol abuse can, of course, also create 
harms to others but the licensing system in and of itself is not designed to  
address these harms. The licensing of liquor outlets places certain restrictions on 
who may sell alcohol and the times and places where it is available; it does not 
restrict how much alcohol an individual consumer can buy or require any checks 
as to whether alcohol leads to reckless or violent behavior on the part of a 
particular person.  Given these dissimilarities, it could well be argued that a 
different regime would be justifiable for licenses granted in relation to performing 
animals and those relating to casinos and liquor.  
The second argument provided by the court is a type of reductio ad absurdum. 
The court argues that if a power as basic as granting licenses to train and exhibit 
animals can be granted to the judiciary and is consistent with the separation of 
powers regime in  South Africa, then it is unclear whether there will be any 
administrative function that can justifiably be excluded from the ambit of 
activities to be performed by the judiciary. The court here seems to assume that 
this power is a very basic administrative power and that, in fact, it cannot be 
distinguished in any meaningful way from the wide range of administrative 
functions that can be conceived.  
Yet, again, however, it may be argued in response that in fact the licensing power 
in this case concerns a very important and grave matter: it relates to the 
protection of creatures that have deep needs and capacities and may be the 
subject to strong abuse in the entertainment world. As such, there could be a 
justifiable distinction drawn between other administrative powers and the 
12 
 
granting of licenses in these cases. Cameron J, in a minority judgment in 2008, 
recognized that animal welfare statutes recognise that animals, 
‘are sentient beings that are capable of suffering and of experiencing pain. 
And they recognise that, regrettably, humans are capable of inflicting 
suffering on animals and causing them pain. The statutes thus acknowledge the need for  
animals to be protected from human ill-treatment.’21 
 It thus could be argued that it would be wholly appropriate for courts to exercise 
the licensing power in the PAPA which should be focused on protecting the 
vulnerable.  
The fact that the Constitutional Court reasoned so thinly and failed to address 
these (rather obvious) arguments does appear in itself to speak volumes. The 
Court in fact saw the matter as purely one of licensing: the protection of 
performing animals was no different from the regulation of casinos and liquor. 
Underlying this view, I would contend, is an assumption deeply rooted in our 
common law tradition that animals are ‘things’ or ‘legal objects’ and not ‘persons’  
or ‘legal subjects’ and so can be treated in a similar way to other ‘things’ or ‘legal 
objects’.22 Yet, it is deeply disappointing to see the Constitutional Court 
uncritically accepting this common law tradition. Indeed, the Constitutional order 
requires us to reflect on common law categories which may no longer be 
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justifiable.23 Its ethos pushes us in the direction of a more caring society that 
takes account of the needs of the most vulnerable.24 In relation to animals, this 
requires our recognition of their particularities and vulnerabilities which require 
particular institutional and substantive responses in the law. By failing to engage 
with the sensitive and difficult subject matter with which this case was concerned, 
the Constitutional Court not only reasoned poorly but did a disservice to the new 
constitutional order it is developing.  
4. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE SAID: RECONSTRUCTING THE COURT’S 
REASONING 
We have seen that the conclusion the court wished to draw is not adequately 
supported by its reasoning. If this is so, was the conclusion the court reached 
nevertheless wrong, namely, that magistrates should not be granted the powers 
to issue licenses and certificates concerning performing animals?   
In my view, the PAPA as an Act is problematic as a whole. The welfare of 
performing animals appears to be the purpose of the Act and its very title 
suggests its goal is protecting performing animals. However, there is very little 
detail as to what is required in order to be involved in exhibiting or training 
performing animals as well as  the harms that animals are to be protected against 
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in these industries. The Act is also meant to govern two rather disparate areas: 
the exhibition and training of animals and the keeping of dogs for safeguarding. 
The Act vaguely requires proof that a person is fit and proper to receive a license 
without clarity as to what forms of evidence would allow for a negative finding by 
a magistrate. It also focuses, particularly, on the  trainer’s credentials rather than 
on what the performance or exhibition inherently involves. Thus, it could be 
argued that, for many types of animals, their exhibition and training  is inherently 
cruel and should not be allowed. Elephants, for instance, are highly intelligent and 
social creatures; they would never naturally perform in a circus, for instance, and 
training methods usually involve a large degree of cruelty. The same is true with 
tigers and lions. 25  Arguably, any attempt to acquire a license under the Act to 
exhibit such creatures should be refused on welfare grounds – yet, the Act is 
unclear whether performances and exhibitions by these animals is permissible. 
Discretion is therefore provided to the magistrates with very little guidance as to 
how it is to be exercised.  
The Constitutional Court has previously held in the Dawood case that ‘[i]t is an 
important principle of the rule of law that rules be stated in a clear and accessible 
manner…if broad discretionary powers contain no express constraints, those who 
are affected by the exercise of the broad discretionary powers will not know what 
is relevant to the exercise of those powers or in what circumstances they are 
entitled to seek relief from an adverse decision’. 26  An unguided discretion such as 
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that contained in the PAPA fails to meet basic rule of law requirements that any 
law must pass. The current provisions of the Act could thus, I would argue, have 
been impugned on the grounds that they fail adequately to provide guidance as 
to the factors that must be taken into account in deciding on any application for a 
license or its renewal.  
If the welfare of animals is to be a central concern in determining whether 
licenses are granted, a number of important factors would need to be considered. 
First, there would need to be clarity as to the nature of the exhibition or training 
activity that an animal is being subjected to. The methods of training that are to 
be employed must also be considered and whether they are consistent with 
animal welfare. Secondly, it would be important to have an understanding of the 
animal in question, its biology, psychology and needs. Thirdly, both the previous 
factors would lead to an evaluation as to whether the training or exhibition 
activity would cause harm to the welfare of the animal inherently. If so, it should 
be prohibited. If not, then the fourth and final element must be considered: 
namely, what conditions are necessary in order to ensure that the welfare of 
animals is protected in these activities. Parties applying for the license would 
need to provide detailed evidence as to how the welfare of the animals would be 
provided for in these activities. Other factors not directly relating to the welfare 
of animals such as the protection of the public from dangerous animals would 
also be relevant.  
Placing the welfare of animals at the forefront of a determination as to whether 
to grant a license in relation to performing animals then leads, importantly, to the 
question as to which branch of government would be best placed to conduct 
16 
 
these enquiries and, to provide, significant protection to these animals. This 
enquiry cannot simply be dismissed in the manner that the Constitutional Court 
approaches the matter. The courts have special inherent powers to protect 
children as their upper guardian – should a similar inherent power be developed 
in relation to non-human animals? Whilst courts are often entrusted with 
protecting the vulnerable, in this case, I would argue that the power of granting 
licenses in relation to performing animals would be better housed in a body set 
up by the executive specifically to address this issue.  
The reason for this is that the factors outlined above for determining whether to 
grant a license are not simple and require detailed attention by experts. The 
protection of animal welfare is really in its infancy in the courts as this case 
demonstrates. The legislature has also recognized the need to set up a special 
statutory body, the NSPCA, to protect animals.27 As such, it would make sense for 
the executive to set up a committee of experts – many of whom should be 
experts in animal welfare and behavior -  who would be tasked with considering  
the compatibility of the performance activity with animal welfare. Some training 
activities for dogs, for instance, are often not cruel and can in fact enhance the 
welfare of these animals, providing them with stimulation and interest in their 
environment. Other forms of performance activity may never be compatible with 
animal welfare and, some may only be permissible under very particular  
circumstances. In order to attain clarity in this regard, and improve protections 
for animals, a special committee housed in the executive would be best placed to 
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make these decisions. Legislation or regulations should also (as indicated above) 
provide further guidance as to the factors that must be considered by this 
committee.  
The Constitutional Court thus reached the right conclusion, in my view, though, its 
reasoning leaves much to be desired. Its pithy argumentation and lack of concern 
for animal welfare in the case also resulted in a poor interim order. Instead of 
seeking evidence as to the working of the current system for protecting animals, 
the Court simply allows the current provisions to continue in operation for 18 
months pending changes to the legislation being made by parliament. This order 
was consistent with the court not really considering the interests of the animals - 
or whether the current system had major deficiencies in realizing the objectives of 
the Act - but simply conceiving of the matter as a simple ‘licensing’ issue. Allowing 
a situation to continue where any magistrate in the country – no matter their 
expertise - has an unguided discretion to grant licenses affecting the very lives 
and well-being of sentient creatures is a dereliction of the Court’s duty to uphold 
the purpose behind this legislation and the important ethos underlying the new 
constitutional order that the vulnerable must be protected.   
The High Court indeed appeared to take the matter more seriously by worrying 
about how the interim arrangements should be governed: the interim order that 
was granted was consistent with the argument I have made, namely, that an 
expert committee needs to be constituted to make these decisions.28 The High 
Court also recognized the urgency of a change in this regard, ordering the 
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legislation to be amended within 6 months.29 It is thus a great pity that the 
Constitutional Court’s order demonstrates such a disregard for the possible  
concrete implications of the current system for animals.  
5. THE COURTS, INDIA AND PERFORMING ANIMALS: A COMPARISON 
It is instructive to consider as a contrast a case brought in India - under similar 
legislation to our own PAPA - relating to the treatment of animals in circuses.30 
The case concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation by the 
Indian government banning the training and exhibition of five animals: bears, 
monkeys, tigers, panthers and lions after this was recommended by an expert 
committee.31  
The court’s reasoning is instructive in this case. It looked at detailed evidence 
provided by animal welfare groups to the government as to the suffering involved 
in training animals (particularly for circuses) of this kind. Some of this evidence is 
indeed entirely shocking. The court quotes a well-known trainer Van Amburgn, 
saying that ‘[t]he subduing of wild beasts is merely the result of merciless 
thrashing while they are young’32. Alfred Court, also a reputed  trainer speaks of 
the most shocking treatment meted out against animals: ‘it was my turn to be 
brutal, terribly brutal and I was ...All the clubs I had left in the cage were broken 
one by one on the tiger’s head; lashes came down like an avalanche, each cutting 
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deep into the tiger’s shining coat’.33 The court thus found that the government 
had made a justifiable decision based on relevant materials.  
The court also considered an argument that the impugned provision is 
unnecessarily discriminatory between animals kept in circuses and zoos. This 
argument was dismissed by the Court in a very interesting way, which contended 
that circuses and zoos are wholly distinguishable. First, the function of circuses is 
as a business purely for profit; whereas zoos seek to perform educational and 
conservation work. 34 Secondly, the impact on the animals is different: whilst zoos 
involve seizure of animals from the wild and translocation, circuses involve these 
elements plus continued training, performance and transportation which is very 
invasive for the animals. Circuses have no regard to animals’ natural needs to 
settle down, to have a place to roam and to avoid being stared at. Instead, 
animals are subjected frequently to very frightening loud audiences and music. 
The court states that ‘circuses using wild animals have become an anachronism’.35 
Importantly, the argument was also made that stopping the use of these animals 
in circuses would infringe the right of the circus owners to carry on their trade or 
business in terms of the Indian Constitution (article 19(1)(g)).36 The court’s 
response again is instructive: ‘[n]o person has any right, much less a fundamental 
right to carry on a trade or business which results in infliction of unnecessary pain 
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or suffering nor a right to carry on a trade or business in an activity which has 
been declared by law as an offence’.37 Thus, the fundamental right to trade could 
not be held to be violated in this instance, or if it was, the limitation would have 
been regarded as justifiable.  
 
The court in a concluding passage makes far-reaching comments about the 
treatment of animals which are important to reproduce:  
 
In conclusion, we hold that circus animals are being forced to perform unnatural tricks, 
are housed in cramped cages, subjected to fear, hunger, pain, not to mention the 
undignified way of life they have to live with no respite and the impugned notification 
has been issued in conformity with the changing scenario, values of human life, 
philosophy of the Constitution, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances 
to prevent the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering on animals. Though not 
homosapiens, they are also beings entitled to dignified existences and humane 
treatment sans cruelty and torture… Therefore, it is not only our fundamental duty to 
show compassion to our animal friends, but also to recognise and protect their rights. In 
this context, we may ask why not our educational institutions offer a course on "Animal 
Rights Law" with an emphasis on fundamental rights as has been done by the Harvard 
Law School recently. If humans are entitled to fundamental rights, why not animals'? In 
our considered opinion; legal rights shall not be the exclusive preserve of the humans 
which has to be extended beyond people thereby dismantling the thick legal wall with 
humans all on one side and all non-human animals on the other side. While the law 
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currently protects wild life and endangered species from extinction, animals are denied 
rights, an anachronism which must necessarily change.’38 
 
The court thus dismissed the petition in question which was taken on appeal to 
the Supreme Court of India.39 The judgment in the Supreme Court is short but it 
renders the protection of animals central to its  reasoning. The Supreme Court 
recognizes that the very purpose of the Act was to prevent unnecessary suffering 
or cruelty being caused to animals and the central government was entitled to 
intervene to prevent this from happening. The Court was also satisfied that the 
government had not acted irresponsibly and had taken into account all relevant 
evidence and taken guidance from an expert committee.  
This Indian case was clearly different to the challenge in the NSPCA case. The 
Indian case related to a particular regulation banning the training of particular 
animals in terms of their equivalent of our PAPA. The reasoning of the two court 
decisions is instructive though: first, they tackle squarely the questions relating to 
animal protection raised by the cases in question and take their role in this regard 
seriously. Secondly, there is a recognition of the need for expertise to address the 
question of how to address the welfare of performing animals and deference is 
given to the executive in this regard which had constituted an expert committee 
to advise on these issues. Such reasoning would support my argument that the 
granting of licenses in relation to performing animals should be done by an expert 
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committee constituted by the executive. Thirdly, the court importantly recognizes 
that animal welfare may be a good reason to restrict commercial trade or 
interests. This is a vital issue in providing protection to performing animals, and 
animals more generally.  
6. Conclusion: Towards Future Legislation for Performing Animals  
Though the cases are different in nature, the Indian decision represents a shining 
example of courts taking their responsibility to animals seriously. In South Africa, 
sadly, the Constitutional Court did not make any lasting pronouncements that 
could aid animals in future litigation. They did, however, for separation of powers 
reasons, force parliament and the executive to amend the PAPA within the next 
18 months. That is in itself a significant development given that, for several years 
now, the Ministry of Agriculture has been suggesting that animal welfare 
legislation will be reviewed. Yet nothing has happened. For the first time, the 
executive and parliament now have a time period within which they have to 
amend at least the PAPA legislation. It is not clear whether the government will 
respond by solely amending the PAPA or seek also to re-draft the Animal 
Protection Act. Either way, there will in the near future be a significant revision to 
the legal framework governing animal welfare in South Africa. In conclusion, I 
shall consider some of issues discussed in this note which should be addressed in 
a revised PAPA. 
First, any new legislation needs to place animal welfare for performing animals at 
its core. In doing so, the scientific understanding of animal welfare needs to be 
incorporated into the Act, recognising that welfare is a vector that includes 
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multiple dimensions.40 These include the physical, emotional and psychological 
well-being of the animal and the realization of its natural capabilities.41 All these 
elements need to be assessed in arriving at a proper understanding of animal 
welfare.  
Secondly, the new legislation should provide detailed criteria that guide the 
evaluation of any application for an animal to be allowed to perform. These 
criteria should include the nature of the performance or activity; the nature and 
type of animal concerned and its needs; whether the performance is inherently 
likely to harm the animal in any way; and, if the measure inherently would not 
harm the animal, what measures are necessary to protect its welfare.  
Finally, a proper institutional forum for making determinations concerning 
applications regarding performing animals must be developed. The idea of an 
expert committee is a good one involving experts in animal welfare 
(veterinarians), animal organizations and members of the government. That 
institutional forum should be empowered to prohibit activities which can be 
shown to involve the systematic abuse of animals. As was evident in the Kerala 
case, the training of animals in circuses often involves a high level of cruelty: such 
‘uses’ of animals should be prohibited. Recently, the government of India has 
banned the keeping of dolphins in captivity: the reason has been that these are 
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highly complex, sentient creatures who suffer from being kept in captivity and 
being forced to perform unnatural tricks.42  
In South Africa, anachronistically, there are still circuses that use live animals in 
performance, there are still dolphins who are required to perform in aquariums 
and there are still elephants who are forcibly removed from the wild and cruelly 
trained to allow tourists onto their backs. Despite its disappointments, the 
Constitutional Court ruling this year has forced the South African government to 
take a hard look at its current statutory regime relating to performing animals and 
to amend it. This is an important step in the reform of this country’s legislation: 
let us hope that it will lead us in the direction of a more caring, humane society 
sensitive to the suffering and plight of the wonderful varied creatures with whom 
we share this planet.  
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